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SUMMARY
The federal Conservative government recently began phasing in a plan to raise the age of eligibility for Old
Age Security from 65 to 67. But a more sensible move for improving the effectiveness of Canada’s social
safety-net system may be to actually lower the age below 65 and rely strictly on an income test instead,
regardless of age. The government could go a lot further toward the reduction of poverty in Canada by
building on the success of its income supports for seniors, and making them available to poor Canadians
of all ages.
Canada can boast of having one of the lowest rates for poverty among seniors in the world, largely due to
its guaranteed income programs for those 65 years and older. When low-income Canadians turn 65 years
old and leave behind low-paying, often unstable jobs, their poverty levels drop substantially. What a
guaranteed income provides, that their vulnerable job situation did not, is a form of protection against
budget shocks — a sudden volatility in income or expenses without the access to savings or credit to
smooth things out until stability returns. A guaranteed income provides a kind of “disaster insurance” that
can protect someone in a crisis situation from going without necessities such as food or even shelter.
Statistics show that the rate of Canadians experiencing “food insecurity” — that is, lack of access to food
because of financial constraints — is half that among Canadians aged 65 to 69 years than it is among
those aged 60 to 64. Self-reported rates of physical and mental health improve markedly as well after low-
income Canadians move from low-wage, insecure employment to a guaranteed income at the age of 65.
That dramatic shift in physical and mental health indicates that expanding guaranteed income programs
to younger Canadians is more than a simple cost calculation: there are potential savings to be found as
poorer Canadians, given a guaranteed income, become healthier and therefore reduce the burden on the
public health-care system. Canadian governments already spend billions of dollars on the downstream
effects of poverty, but scant emphasis is put on programs targeting poverty’s roots. 
There is no evidence, where smaller-scale experiments have been tried, to show that a guaranteed income
program creates a serious problem with negative incentives and discourages people from working who
otherwise might. But because this is a common worry with working-age guaranteed income eligibility,
phasing in the program gradually, by lowering eligibility a few years at a time, will allow ongoing
investigation and analysis of the effects, before the program is rolled out on a large scale. The tremendous
impact that guaranteed incomes have had on reducing poverty and improving health among seniors is
something for which Canadians can be rightly proud. So much so that it is incumbent upon us to
investigate whether Canada could use the same policy tools to drastically reduce poverty and improve
health among Canadians of all ages.
† The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of the anonymous referees. 
* This research was supported by the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (FRN 115208).
INTRODUCTION
A remarkable policy achievement of Canadian governments has been the dramatic reduction in
poverty rates of Canadians 65 and older through the creation of an income floor, or guaranteed
annual income (GAI), delivered through Canada’s public pension system.1 The system consists
of the Old Age Security (OAS) program, which is a universal demogrant, the income-tested
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), and the contributory Canada Pension Plan (CPP).2
Mintz and Wilson3 specifically note that with only 5.9 per cent of older Canadians living below
the poverty line, Canada has one of the lowest rates of elder poverty in the world.
Conservative senator Hugh Segal has asked why Canadians have not taken the lesson from the
success of the GIS and applied it, as an automatic tax-based top up for income, to reduce
poverty rates among Canadians more broadly.4 For Canadians under the age of 65, we continue
to rely on a patchwork of programs and approaches for addressing poverty, including provincial
social assistance/welfare and employment supports, and various training programs intended to
encourage more Canadians to earn more through the labour market. In cases of emergency, our
most impoverished citizens are reliant on temporary relief from community programs and
charity, as exemplified by food banks and homeless shelters. As Segal has pointed out, despite
governments spending billions of dollars on the downstream effects of poverty — such as
working with school dropouts, young people in trouble with the law or those who need safe
houses in situations of family violence — not addressing the root causes of poverty or
insufficient income has resulted in the inevitable persistence of poverty for Canadians under the
age of 65.
In this paper we investigate the potential implications for non-elderly poverty in Canada by
estimating the impacts of the guaranteed annual income floor, provided to Canadians 65 and
over through federal public pension plans, on household food insecurity prevalence and self-
reported health and mental health. To make our case, we do not rely on income-based measures
of poverty, such as Statistics Canada’s Low Income Cut-Off, but instead use a consumption-
based indicator of material deprivation: household food insecurity (lack of access to adequate
1 Ken Battle, “Rethinking Income Support: A Guaranteed Annual Income” (Caledon Institute of Social Policy, Library
of Parliament Seminar Series: 2008).
2 Most recently, the federal government introduced changes to the age of eligibility from 65 to 67 for its public
pensions, Old Age Security (OAS) and Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), and only recently has the potential
adverse impact on poverty rates of seniors been discussed. Herbert J.C. Emery, Valerie C. Fleisch and Lynn McIntyre,
“Legislated Changes to Federal Pension Income in Canada Will Adversely Affect Low Income Seniors’ Health,”
Preventive Medicine 57, 6, (2013): 963-966; Jack M. Mintz, and Thomas A. Wilson, “Reform Proposals for
Replenishing Retirement Savings,” SPP Research Papers 6, 9 (2013): 7-8. Mintz and Wilson propose de-coupling the
age of eligibility for OAS and GIS so that low-income Canadians can continue to receive GIS from age 65.
3 Mintz and Wilson, “Reform Proposals.”
4 Hugh Segal, “Guaranteed Annual Income: Why Milton Friedman and Bob Stanfield Were Right,” Policy Options,
(April 2008), http://intraspec.ca/segal.pdf; Hugh Segal, “Scrapping Welfare. The Case for Guaranteeing All Canadians
an Income above the Poverty Line,” Literary Review of Canada (December 2012),
http://reviewcanada.ca/essays/2012/12/01/scrapping-welfare/.
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food because of financial constraints). Using an outcome measure reflecting material
deprivation, such as household food insecurity, provides an opportunity to study poverty from a
different perspective.5
Using data from the 2009–2010 Canadian Community Health Survey, we show that food
insecurity prevalence rates for not married persons with less than $20,000 in annual income
fall by half between the ages of 60–64 and 65–69 years. We show that this is largely the result
of a shift in income source for these Canadians, from employment and various income-
assistance programs, to federal public pensions. In other words, the introduction of a GAI at
age 65 that provides consumption insurance reduces food insecurity risk. We then demonstrate
coincident improvements in self-reported health and mental health status that are associated
with sizeable reductions in health-care utilization that would imply offsetting reductions in
provincial health spending that arise from federal spending on pensions.6
Based on our analysis, we propose that extending eligibility for an income floor along the
terms of federal public pension benefits, particularly the income-tested GIS, to Canadians
under the age of 65 would be an effective policy change for addressing poverty. Ostensibly, we
are proposing to establish an income floor for Canadians through a guaranteed annual income
by defining OAS/GIS-benefit eligibility solely on an income test rather than the current
combined age and income test. Critics of this policy direction have highlighted the high
potential costs of a guaranteed annual income largely based on concerns of labour-supply
disincentive effects.7 While an earlier literature, investigating the broader social and economic
impacts of negative income taxes and guaranteed annual incomes, does not support this
concern, concerns over labour-supply disincentives could be addressed by phasing in the
eligibility for OAS/GIS for younger ages along the lines recently introduced by the federal
Conservative government aimed at raising the age of OAS eligibility from 65 to 67.8 Further,
as we explain below, the GAI is addressing market failures, so efficiency gains arising from the
program would be expected to reduce the net costs of the scheme through reduced provincial
health-care spending, increased investment in schooling, and reduced food bank and homeless
shelter use. As Glen Hodgson of the Conference Board of Canada has pointed out, “a GAI
might produce sizable net fiscal savings, especially for provinces.”9
5 There has been significant debate about the advantages of using consumption expenditures as opposed to income
measures to study poverty. See: Bruce D. Meyer and James X. Sullivan, “Measuring the Well-Being of the Poor
Using Income and Consumption,” Journal of Human Resources 38 (2003): 1180-220; Bruce D. Meyer and James X.
Sullivan, “Viewpoint: Further Results on Measuring the Well-Being of the Poor Using Income and Consumption,”
Canadian Journal of Economics 44, 1 (2011): 52-87; Matthew Brzozowski and Thomas F. Crossley, “Viewpoint:
Measuring the Well-Being of the Poor with Income or Consumption: A Canadian Perspective,” Canadian Journal of
Economics 44, 1 (2011): 88-106. Current income may not properly measure households consumption, particularly for
low-income households, as it includes transitory changes in income that might not necessarily impact the household’s
living standards due to their buffering capability through access to credit, savings, assets, family support etc.; none of
which are reflected in an income measure. While expenditure data give a better indication of the material level of
consumption of the household than do income, expenditure levels, like current incomes, they are not readily
interpretable in terms of poverty or deprivation/privation other than in the sense that lower is worse than higher.
Defining “poverty lines” to evaluate income or expenditure levels does not fully solve this problem. 
6 Lori J. Curtis and William J. MacMinn, “Health Care Utilization in Canada: Twenty-five Years of Evidence,”
Canadian Public Policy 34, 1 (2008): 65-88; Evelyn Forget, “The Town with No Poverty: The Health Effects of a
Canadian Guaranteed Annual Income Field Experiment,” Canadian Public Policy 37, 3 (2011): 283-305.
7 Kevin Milligan, “Should Canada Have a Guaranteed Annual Income?” The Globe and Mail, October 20, 2010. 
8 See pages 23-36 for an extensive discussion of the literature on labour-market disincentives.
9 Glen Hodgson, “A Big Idea Whose Time Has Yet to Arrive: A Guaranteed Annual Income” (Ottawa: Conference
Board of Canada, 2011), http://www.conferenceboard.ca/economics/hot_eco_topics/default/11-12-
15/a_big_idea_whose_time_has_yet_to_arrive_a_guaranteed_annual_income.aspx.
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3Why a guaranteed annual income addresses poverty 
There is a tendency to think of poverty solely in terms of an income level: Is a household’s
usual income sufficient to purchase what it needs? Chronic poverty or its material
manifestations, such as chronic homelessness or chronic household food insecurity, would be a
result of households persistently having insufficient money to pay for basic shelter or food.
While this may describe some of the poor in Canada, there are many other poor households in
Canada where household food insecurity or homelessness are dynamic, transitory situations.
Focusing on poverty as a problem of insufficient income level leads to beliefs that addressing
poverty through the alleviation of its symptoms is justified solely on distributive grounds —
i.e., it is the right thing to do to help those in need.10 What is often not well understood is the
efficiency case for addressing the root causes of poverty, and that poverty itself is a symptom
of market failure.
Symptoms of poverty, such as homelessness or household food insecurity, in this context, are
not solely the product of an inadequate income level, but instead a lack of consumption
insurance to address budget shocks — unexpected decreases in income or purchasing power of
income. The ability to buffer against budget shocks, to maintain consumption levels when the
budget is unexpectedly constrained, is a product of a surplus in the budget or the adjustable
discretionary expenditure, and access to credit or assets. 
Most households in Canada that are considered poor do not have the capacity to smooth
consumption through saving or borrowing or deferring purchases of non-essential goods when
household expenses are unexpectedly high or household income is unexpectedly low; indeed,
they regularly tend to consume their full current income.11 On average, lower-income
households with less ability to adjust to budget shocks due to a lack of budget surplus or access
to assets or credit need smaller shocks to push them over the threshold for food insecurity than
do higher-income households; all things being equal, it takes bigger shocks to harm higher
income. As small shocks likely occur with greater frequency than large shocks, the
prevalence/risk of food insecurity is higher when incomes are lower. 
10 For example, see the discussion in Margot Young and James P. Mulvale,“Possibilities and Prospects: The Debate
Over a Guaranteed Income” (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2009),
http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/reports/docs/CCPA_Guaranteed_Income_Nov
_2009.pdf.
11 Leete and Bania find that liquidity-constrained households have an increased probability of food insecurity from
negative income shocks but do not have a decreased probability of food insecurity from positive income shocks
(Laura Leete and Neil Bania, “The Effect of Income Shocks on Food Insufficiency,” Review of Economics of the
Household 8, 4 (2010): 505-526). Their model of a utility-maximizing household shows that this pattern is consistent
with negative transitory income changes that leave households with insufficient income to afford their planned
consumption, while positive transitory income shocks have no influence on the households’ choices since their
consumption plan is based on permanent income. This asymmetry of the effects of positive and negative changes on
household food insecurity indicates the potential positive effects of policies that buffer households against transitory
income shocks.
If we think about the problems of poverty from this perspective of consumption insurance,
Canada’s reliance on food banks, homeless shelters and occasional relief through government
and charity to address periodic, transitory budget shocks amounts to “disaster insurance” —
support for infrequent, large negative events that are not expected to repeat. When the
purchasing power of low-income households falls, or income variability in such households
increases, the number of negative events requiring intervention rises. In such circumstances,
disaster insurance can do nothing to prevent the problem from recurring. Further, as health is
adversely affected by homelessness and household food insecurity,12 falling into those states
may increase the likelihood of suffering a further negative event if income or its purchasing
power is affected by poorer health. 
In contrast, consumption insurance as provided through a GAI provides liquidity-constrained
households with the capacity to smooth consumption in the face of relatively small but
frequent shocks. This reduces the role for reactive interventions, such as food banks or
homeless shelters, to that of dealing with the consequences of large but infrequent shocks.
Forget13 points out, in her examination of the Manitoba Basic Annual Income Experiment — or
Mincome, which ran from 1975–1978 — that a guaranteed annual income is really about
providing households with consumption insurance that is not available to them through private
means and markets.14 To the extent that being housed and food secure leads to better health
outcomes, the GAI may further reduce the likelihood of bad outcomes through the
improvements of income and its purchasing power. By correcting the market failure of the
missing consumption insurance market for liquidity-constrained households, the GAI is an
efficiency-enhancing intervention that can reduce the effective insufficiency of income as a
root cause of poverty. 
12 Household food insecurity and homelessness are linked to a wide range of adverse consequences for physical and
psychosocial health and well-being among children, youth, and adults. For studies on the impact of household food
insecurity on health, see: Janet Che and Jiajian Chen, “Food Insecurity in Canadian Households,” Health Reports 12,
4 (2001): 11-22; Sharon I. Kirkpatrick, Lynn McIntyre and Melissa Potestio, “Child Hunger and Long-Term Adverse
Consequences for Health,” Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine 164, 8 (2010): 754-762; Lynn McIntyre,
Jeanne V.A. Williams, Dina H. Lavorato, and Scott Patten, “Depression and Suicide Ideation in Late Adolescence
and Early Adulthood Are an Outcome of Child Hunger,” Journal of Affective Disorders 150, 1 (2012): 123-129;
Nicholas T. Vozoris and Valerie Tarasuk, “Household Food Insufficiency Is Associated with Poorer Health,” The
Journal of Nutrition 133, 1 (2003): 120-126.
For studies on the impact of homelessness on health, see: Jennifer P. Edidin et al., “The Mental and Physical Health
of Homeless Youth: A Literature Review,” Child Psychiatry and Human Development 43, 3 (2012): 354-375; C.
James Frankish, Stephen W. Hwang and Darryl Quantz, “The Relationship between Homelessness and Health: An
Overview of Research in Canada,” in Finding Home: Policy Options for Addressing Homelessness in Canada, ed. J.
David Hulchanski et al. (Toronto: Homeless Hub, Cities Centre, University of Toronto, 2009); Timothy Stablein and
Allison A. Appleton, “A Longitudinal Examination of Adolescent and Young Adult Homeless Experience, Life
Course Transitions, and Health,” Emerging Adulthood (July 15 2013).
13 Evelyn Forget, “The Town,” 290.
14 ibid.
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Household food insecurity is a useful consumption-based indicator of both poverty and
lack of insurance against income shocks
Food insecurity is generally measured at the household level and implies that the overriding
reason for food-access problems is financial constraint. Risk factors for experiencing
household food insecurity include a variety of socio-demographic and socio-economic
household characteristics such as low income, low level of education, higher number of
children, being a lone parent-led household, living in rental accommodation, or being
aboriginal.15
Household food insecurity is a dynamic occurrence, influenced by changes in income levels
and household expenses.16 Such income and/or expenditure changes (e.g., unexpected health
expenses) likely impact food expenditures and often result in vulnerable households becoming
food insecure.17 Thus, similar to poverty, household food insecurity can be chronic (long term);
for example, when households have insufficient income levels for extended periods of time. Or
it can be short term; for example, when households experience budget/income shocks due to ill
health, rising housing or energy costs or other sudden unexpected changes.18
Food insecurity risk is greatest for households with low incomes, but the risk exists across the
income distribution: not all poor households are food insecure and not all non-poor households
are food secure. Food insecurity arises from incomplete protection in some households from
income shocks that are otherwise insured against in other households. Households that
experience food insecurity lack the capacity to buffer consumption against unexpected changes
in incomes or costs. Lacking any surplus or reserves in their budget, assets, or access to credit
(borrowing), food insecure households are liquidity-constrained and, consequently, they must
adjust consumption when income falls or household costs rise. For example, low-income
families in Canada devote a substantial portion of their monthly budgets to food,19 leaving only
15 Che and Chen, “Food Insecurity”; Valerie Tarasuk, “Household Food Insecurity in Canada,” Topics in Clinical
Nutrition 20, 4 (2005): 299-312; Valerie Tarasuk and Janet Vogt, “Household Food Insecurity in Ontario,” Canadian
Journal of Public Health 100, 3 (2009): 184-188; Valerie Tarasuk, Andy Mitchell and Naomi Dachner, Household
Food Insecurity in Canada, 2011 (Toronto: Research To Identify Policy Options to Reduce Food Insecurity, 2013),
http://nutritionalsciences.lamp.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Household-Food-Insecurity-in-Canada-
2011.pdf.
16 Craig Gundersen and Joseph Gruber, “The Dynamic Determinants of Food Insufficiency,” in Second Food Security
Measurement and Research Conference, Vol. II, ed. Margaret Andrews and Mark Prell (Washington: USDA, ERS
Food Assistance and Nutrition Research Report, 2001), 92-110; Leete and Bania, “The Effect”; Donald Rose,
“Economic Determinants and Dietary Consequences of Food Insecurity in the United States,” Journal of Nutrition
129, 2 (1999): 517S-520S; Valerie Tarasuk, Lynn McIntyre and Jinguang Li, “Low Income Women's Dietary Intakes
Are Sensitive to the Depletion of Household Resources in One Month,” The Journal of Nutrition 137, 8 (2007):
1980-1987. 
17 Valerie Tarasuk, “A Critical Examination of Community-Based Responses to Household Food Insecurity in Canada,”
Health Education and Behavior 28, 4 (2001): 487-499; Nicholas Vozoris, Barbara Davis and Valerie Tarasuk, “The
Affordability of a Nutritious Diet for Households on Welfare in Toronto,” Canadian Journal of Public Health 93, 1
(2002): 36-40. 
18 Herbert J.C. Emery et al., “Evidence of the Association between Household Food Insecurity and Heating Cost
Inflation in Canada, 1998-2001,” Canadian Public Policy 38, 2 (2012): 181-215; Lynn McIntyre, Sarah K. Connor
and James Warren, “Child Hunger in Canada: Results of the 1994 National Longitudinal Survey of Children and
Youth, Canadian Medical Association Journal 163, 8 (2000): 961-965; Tarasuk, McIntyre and Li., “Low Income”;
Tarasuk, “A Critical Examination.”
19 Sharon Kirkpatrick and Valerie Tarasuk, “The Relationship between Low Income and Household Food Expenditure
Patterns in Canada,” Public Health Nutrition 6, 6 (2003): 589-97.
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a restricted budget to face other expenses. With the residual funds, poor families try to balance
other expenses, such as heating expenditures. It has been shown that rising energy costs, for
example, lead these families to make “heat or eat” decisions, because their ability to absorb
shocks is low.20
Differences in incomes available through public sources to Canadians aged 65 and older
versus under 65
The basic idea of a guaranteed annual income is to set an income floor (of a defined amount)
for every citizen/resident of a country. Although Canada does not have a GAI system per se, it
does provide a basic annual income floor to one group of citizens: seniors. The federally
funded public pension system (consisting of Old Age Security, Guaranteed Income Supplement
for low-income seniors, and GIS Allowance for widowed spouses of low-income seniors) is a
system that was gradually put in place in the 1960s and 1970s. The basic federally funded
income floor provided through the OAS system in Canada to eligible seniors consists of
$14,708 per year (maximum payment for a single person in 2011).21
It has been widely acknowledged that the Canadian pension system is one of Canada’s major
social policy success stories, as it has caused the poverty rates among seniors to drop
substantially after it was implemented.22 Remarkably, despite decades of strong labour market
conditions23 and rising household incomes, many Canadian households, particularly those of
unattached individuals, rely primarily on OAS and GIS benefits for income after age 65.24
Before turning 65 years old (the current eligibility age), individuals are reliant on either
employment income and/or social transfer payments through the provinces. The level of
funding available to those on social assistance varies substantially from province to province
and is arguably related to political sentiment and provincial economic performance, rather than
to the basic cost of living in each province.
20 Emery et al., “Evidence of the Association.” 
21 Service Canada, “Old Age Security Payment Amounts,”
http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/services/pensions/oas/payments/index.shtml.
22 Conference Board of Canada, “How Canada performs” (2013),
http://www.conferenceboard.ca/hcp/details/society.asp; John Myles, “The Maturation of Canada's Retirement Income
System: Income Levels, Income Inequality and Low Income among Older Persons,” Canadian Journal on Aging 19,
3 (2000): 287-316; Lars Osberg, “Poverty among Senior Citizens: a Canadian Success Story,” in The State of
Economics in Canada: Festschrift in Honour of David Slater, ed. Patrick Grady and Andrew Sharpe (Centre for the
Study of Living Standards, 2001), 151-181; Tammy Schirle, “Senior poverty in Canada: A decomposition analysis,”
Canadian Public Policy 39, 4 (2013): forthcoming.
23 Ronald Kneebone and Margarita Gres, “Trends, Peaks, and Troughs: National and Regional Employment Cycles in
Canada,” The SPP Research Papers 6, 21 (2013).
24 Ross Finnie, David Gray and Yan Zhang, “Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) Status Amongst the Retired
Population: An Analysis of the Incidence,” Canadian Public Policy 39 (Supplement), (2013): S65-S80; National
Advisory Council on Ageing (NACA), “Seniors on the Margin: Ageing in Poverty in Canada” (Ottawa: Government
of Canada, 2005), http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/H88-5-3-2005E.pdf.
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Figure 1 depicts the highest total welfare income for a single person considered employable in
the Canadian provinces (excluding Prince Edward Island, Nunavut, the Northwest Territories
and the Yukon), compared to the basic income floor of $14,708 provided through OAS and
GIS for 2011.25 Besides significant variations regarding assistance levels (the lowest being
$6,696 in New Brunswick and the highest being $9,821 for Newfoundland and Labrador),
none of the provincial payments even come close to the basic income floor paid out through
seniors’ benefits.26
FIGURE 1: MAXIMUM ANNUAL WELFARE INCOMES (SINGLE, EMPLOYABLE PERSON) BY PROVINCE
The red horizontal line represents the federally funded income floor provided through the OAS/GIS system in Canada to
eligible seniors. Welfare in this graph is defined as: basic social assistance + federal child benefits + provincial/territorial
child benefit + provincial tax credits + GST credit + additional social assistance program benefits. 
Sources: National Council of Welfare, “Welfare Incomes 2011” (Ottawa: Ministry of Public Works and 
Government Services, 2011); Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, CPP & OAS Stats 
Book 2010: Statistics Related to Canada Pension Plan and Old Age Security Programs (Ottawa: 
2010). 
Where public discourse views Canada’s first pillar of the pension system as a floor on which
seniors land after enjoying higher incomes while employed, for many poor near-senior
Canadians, the first pillar is a substantial “step up” in income level and income stability
compared with the precarious employment and social assistance that they relied on prior to
age 65.27
25 National Council on Welfare, “Welfare Incomes 2011”; Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, CPP &
OAS Stats Book 2010: Statistics Related to Canada Pension Plan and Old Age Security Programs (Ottawa: 2010). 
26 Some provincial governments offer income supplements to seniors living in their jurisdictions. The basic income
floor deemed appropriate for a poor senior in those provinces is higher than $14,708. For information on Ontario’s
provincial supplement, see: Ontario Ministry of Finance website, “Ontario Guaranteed Annual Income System,”
http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/credit/gains/.
27 National Advisory Council on Ageing, “Seniors on the Margin.”
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Unlike the case for Canadians age 65 and over, who are provided with a stated minimum level
of income, provincial total welfare benefits (basic social assistance plus additional benefits
such as the GST credit and provincial tax credits) for those under age 65 have no set
entitlement for benefits other than a potential maximum entitlement. The transfers represent the
maximum amount of support for an eligible recipient with little certainty and, as Figure 1
shows, the ceiling is much lower than the income floor for seniors.
Households receiving pensions as their main income source have a lower prevalence of food
insecurity than other population groups.28 In 2007–2008, households reporting income from
seniors’ benefits or salaries/wages showed the lowest rates of food insecurity (6.1 per cent and
4.8 per cent, respectively) in Canada. Considering these numbers, it is of interest to investigate
whether providing an income floor to all Canadians — or expanding the GAI system to all
Canadians — would be an effective and efficient anti-poverty strategy.
METHODS
Data source
For this study, our data are from the public-use files of the Canadian Community Health
Survey (CCHS) Cycle 5.1 for 2009–2010.29 The CCHS is a cross-sectional survey that collects
health and socio-demographic data from a large representative sample of the Canadian
population. Analyses were restricted to respondents in four age groups, covering two groups of
different proximities to age-eligibility for GIS/OAS (55–59 years, 60–64 years), and two
groups of differing post-eligibility ages for GIS/OAS (65–69 years, and 70–74 years). We also
restricted our analysis to respondents with an annual personal income30 of $20,000 or less to
control for respondents’ income levels and only analyzed data from unattached respondents
(this included single, divorced, separated, and widowed).
Observations from respondents with missing household food insecurity responses, and data
from the Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut and Prince Edward Island, were excluded (the
territories have large aboriginal populations with confounding factors influencing food
insecurity, and all excluded jurisdictions have small population sizes). The population-weighted
total sample sizes after all exclusions were 140,000 for 55–59 year olds, 120,000 for 60–64
year olds, 130,000 for 65–69 year olds and 110,000 for 70–74 year olds. The fact that these
sample sizes are similar speaks to the fact that the populations are likely similar, rather than
there being a large proportion of near seniors moving into the lowest-income quintile after
retirement.
28 Che and Chen, “Food Insecurity”; Health Canada, “Canadian Community Health Survey, Cycle 2.2, Nutrition
(2004): Income-Related Household Food Security in Canada” (Ottawa: 2007), ISBN 978-0-662-45455-7,
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/fn-an/surveill/nutrition/commun/income_food_sec-sec_alim-eng.php; Health Canada,
“Household Food Insecurity in Canada in 2007-2008: Key Statistics and Graphics” (Ottawa: 2011), http://www.hc-
sc.gc.ca/fn-an/surveill/nutrition/commun/insecurit/key-stats-cles-2007-2008-eng.php#fn-np7; Tarasuk and Vogt,
“Household Food.”
29 We also conducted the same analysis using data from CCHS 4.1, 2007–2008. As data from both cycles produced the
same results, we chose to present the results from the more recent cycle.
30 We also conducted the analysis based on samples of unattached individuals with household incomes less than
$20,000 per year. This sample produced substantively similar results.
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Measures 
Food insecurity, as measured through the Household Food Security Survey Module,31 was used
as the main outcome measure. The variable “FSCDHFS,” a dichotomous summary measure of
food insecurity status over the preceding 12 months by severity, is derived by Statistics Canada
from its 18-question food insecurity module. As secondary outcome measures, we used self-
reported health and self-reported mental health to determine if the income floor through federal
pension benefits improved health in eligible age groups. To demonstrate that income source
mattered to the outcomes, main income source was broken down into the categories
“employment income,” “employment insurance (EI)/workers’ compensation/social assistance”
(no finer classification is available in the public-use files), “seniors’ benefits” (which would
include OAS and GIS for the 65–74 year olds), and “other income.” We otherwise did not
control for covariates because the only variable of interest was age group above or below the
OAS and GIS age-65 eligibility threshold. 
Statistical analyses
Using simple descriptive statistics, we compared the prevalence of food insecurity between the
two age groups of interest. As food insecurity is a household-level outcome, we weighted the
analyses using household weights to accommodate the survey-design effect of CCHS. Data
were analyzed using STATA 11.0.32
RESULTS 
In presenting the results of our analysis, we first demonstrate the sizeable shift in income
source for these low-income (as defined by a personal income less than $20,000 per year in
this study) individuals in Canada, from employment and various income-assistance programs,
to federal public pensions as they move from 55 years of age through to 74 years of age. We
then document reductions in food insecurity, and changes in self-reported health and mental
health in the age groups.
31 Gary Bickel et al., Guide to Measuring Household Food Security, Revised 2000 (Washington: USDA, Food and
Nutrition Service, 2000), http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsec/files/fsguide.pdf; Health Canada, “Canadian Community
Health Survey, Cycle 2.2, Nutrition (2004): Income-Related Household Food Security in Canada.”
32 Stata Corp. (College Station, Texas).
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Turning 65 changes the main personal income source for low-income Canadians
As Figure 2 shows, there is a pronounced change in sources of income for low-income
Canadians under age 65 and those aged 65 and over. Employment income and EI/workers’
compensation/social assistance each constituted the major income source for about one-third of
low-income Canadians aged 55–64; in contrast, over 80 per cent of low-income Canadians
aged 65–74 report “seniors’ benefits” as their major source of income. Only 12 per cent of
individuals aged 65 years or older reported employment income as their main income source.
FIGURE 2: MAIN PERSONAL INCOME SOURCE FOR LOW-INCOME UNATTACHED RESPONDENTS BY AGE GROUP 
(WEIGHTED), CCHS 5.1 (2009/2010)
EI = employment insurance; Workers’ Comp = workers’ compensation; SA = social assistance.
Employment income includes wages and salaries, and income from self-employment.
Social assistance includes provincial or municipal social assistance, or welfare.
Seniors’ benefits include benefits from Canada Pension Plan or Quebec Pension Plan, Old Age Security, and Guaranteed
Income Supplement.
Other income includes dividends and interest, job-related retirement pensions, superannuation and annuities, RRSP/RRIF
(Registered Retirement Savings Plan/Registered Retirement Income Fund), Child Tax Benefit, child support, alimony, and
other (e.g., rental income, scholarships).
Changing the income source at age 65 from employment, EI/workers’
compensation/social assistance, to seniors’ benefits results in a marked drop in food
insecurity prevalence
Regardless of income source, food insecurity rates were substantially higher in the younger
groups than in older age groups; specifically, 34 per cent of respondents in the 55–59-year age
group and 27 per cent of respondents in the 60–64-year age group were food insecure. Food
insecurity among seniors was reduced by more than half (14 per cent in those aged 65–69
years and 12 per cent in the 70–74-year age group). Figure 3 shows how food insecurity varies
by income source, as well as how a decrease in household food insecurity correlated with older
age (and thus, reliance on seniors’ benefits). When the main source of income was reported to
be through employment, about 20 per cent of respondents were food insecure, regardless of
age. In contrast, reliance on EI/workers’ compensation/social assistance resulted in a very high
rate of food insecurity of between 40 per cent and 50 per cent for individuals aged 55–69 years
of age. Respondents reporting their main income from seniors’ benefits had prevalence rates of
10
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food insecurity of 29 per cent (for the 55–59-years group), 22 per cent (60–64 years), 15 per
cent (65–69 years), and 11 per cent (70–74 years). For the ages 55–64, seniors’ benefits would
not include OAS or GIS but would include Canada Pension Plan or Quebec Pension Plan
benefits. These rates are very similar to what we found for income from employment. These
results suggest that seniors’ benefits provide similar protection from food insecurity as does
employment, whereas reliance on EI/workers’ compensation/social assistance leads to
pronounced rates of food insecurity. Because all respondents had an income below $20,000, we
cannot differentiate between the effect of income source on food insecurity or whether the
actual income level within the income group rose to reduce food insecurity prevalence.
FIGURE 3: FOOD INSECURITY PREVALENCE OF LOW-INCOME UNATTACHED RESPONDENTS BY AGE GROUP AND 
PERSONAL INCOME SOURCE (WEIGHTED), CCHS 5.1 (2009/2010)
EI = employment insurance; Workers’ Comp = workers’ compensation; SA = social assistance.
See Figure 2 for details on income source. 
Turning 65 leads to better self-reported health and self-reported mental health over and
above the reduction seen in food insecurity for those receiving seniors’ benefits
In general, receiving seniors’ benefits improved health and mental health, over and above the
effect that benefits had on food insecurity status, which were also notable (Table 1). For self-
reported health among the food insecure, the percentage of respondents reporting fair/poor
health in the two age groups below age 65 was approximately 55 per cent. This decreases to 34
per cent for the 65–69 year olds, and then rises again (as one would expect as part of the aging
process) to 49 per cent for the 70–74 year olds (but is still lower than those 10 to 15 years
younger). As was observed with self-reported health, receiving seniors’ benefits improved self-
reported mental health even amongst the food insecure after they turned age 65. Specifically,
the proportion of food insecure respondents with poor/fair mental health dropped by more than
half in the older age groups (receiving seniors’ benefits) compared to the younger age groups
— from 36.5 per cent in the 55–59-year group and 29 per cent in the 60–64-year group, to 17
per cent and 13 per cent in the 65–69-year age group and 70–74-year age group, respectively,
indicating that mental health benefits persisted despite aging. Among the food insecure in these
age groups, higher rates of fair/poor self-reported health and mental health were observed than
were observed among their food secure counterparts, but still, overall rates of both food
insecurity and poor health and mental health were lowered in those older than 65 years.
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TABLE 1: PROPORTIONS OF LOW-INCOME UNATTACHED RESPONDENTS WITH FAIR/POOR SELF-REPORTED HEALTH 
AND SELF-REPORTED MENTAL HEALTH BY AGE GROUP AND FOOD SECURITY STATUS (WEIGHTED), CCHS 5.1 
(2009/2010)
DISCUSSION
Our analysis shows that food insecurity prevalence decreases significantly (by almost 50 per
cent) for low-income Canadians eligible for federal public pension benefits. This is due to a
shift in income source from employment and various transfer payment to seniors’ benefits
(largely OAS and GIS) once they turn 65 years old. Moreover, self-reported health and self-
reported mental health status were consistently better in the food secure and, among the food
insecure, decreased markedly in the two older age groups (65 years and older). These findings
suggest that the receipt of public pension benefits has a pronounced effect on reducing
household food insecurity and on improving the health and mental health of low-income
Canadians.
This analysis provides support for a GAI for our most impoverished Canadians younger than
age 65, with novel insights into potential yields related to health and mental health. This
scheme would extend eligibility for an income floor through a guaranteed annual income by
defining benefit eligibility for the existing GIS/OAS federal pension benefits based solely on
an income test rather than the current combined age and income test. Implementation could be
phased in through the lowering of the age of eligibility for the income-tested pension benefits.
Our proposition is in contrast to recent legislated changes to the Canadian federal pension
system, which will gradually raise the age eligibility for OAS/GIS by two years (from 65 to 67
years old). We suggest that reductions in health-care utilization could result from a non-age-
tested benefit, leading to reductions in provincial health spending, and offsetting much of the
increase in federal public pension costs associated with extending an income floor based on the
existing Guaranteed Income Supplement program to younger age-groups of Canadians. 
Our proposal for addressing poverty is not particularly new. Considerable efforts to design GAI
schemes were undertaken in the 1970s, but the idea of a GAI has been in and out of Canadian
policy discussions ever since.33 Senator David Croll, who chaired the Canadian Senate’s
committee on poverty in the 1970s, recommended a federal GAI in the form of negative 
33 James P. Mulvale, ”Desperately Seeking a New Model of Economic Security for Canada: the Basic Income
Approach,” Canadian Social Work 10, 1 (2008); Richard Pereira, “Economic Security in the Twenty-First Century —
Guaranteed Annual Income (GAI), An Ecological, Democratic, Justice and Food Security Imperative” (Master of
Arts Thesis, Athabasca University, October 2009); David H. Croll, “Poverty in Canada,” in The Empire Club of
Canada Speeches 1971-1972, (Toronto: The Empire Club Foundation, 1972), 191-204.
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ALL FOOD INSECURE
55 to 59 40.0 (33.4, 46.5) 21.6 (16.9, 26.4) 56.5 (43.6, 69.4) 36.5 (26.0, 46.9)
60 to 64 39.8 (34.8, 44.9) 17.3 (13.5, 21.0) 55.1 (45.0, 65.2) 29.1 (20.3, 37.9)
65 to 69 31.5 (26.9, 36.0) 10.5 (7.7, 13.3) 33.7 (22.3, 45.1) 17.1 (7.6, 26.7)
70 to 74 35.7 (31.0, 40.4) 7.7 (5.4, 9.9) 49.4 (34.4, 64.4) 12.6 (3.5, 21.8)
Self-reported health
= fair/poor
Self-reported mental
health = fair/poor
Self-reported 
health = fair/poor
Self-reported mental
health = fair/poor
Proportion 95% CI Proportion 95% CI Proportion 95% CI Proportion 95% CI
(%) (%) (%) (%)
income tax (based on need, and incorporating work incentives) in 1972. It was planned as an
addition to the Canada Pension Plan, unemployment insurance and agreements with First
Nations and Inuit Canadians. One out of the five major experiments with negative income tax
(NIT), conducted around the same time (Mincome), was based in Canada, specifically in the
province of Manitoba (see below).34 In 1985, the Macdonald Commission recommended its so-
called Universal Income Security Program; however, suggested benefit levels were so low that
it was felt that this type of GAI would be ineffective for decreasing poverty and thus the idea
received strong opposition and was ultimately dropped. After this proposal, the idea of a GAI
seemed to have disappeared from the Canadian consciousness for almost two decades. It
experienced a resurgence in the early years of the new millennium, when a variety of different
groups (e.g., the Canadian Council of Social Development, various feminist groups and senator
Hugh Segal) in Canada started advocating for a GAI as a poverty-alleviation measure once
more;35 there is, in fact, a resurgence underway at this time: “The Basic Income Guarantee
(BIG) Push” is being championed through the Basic Income Canada Network.36
When GAI models have been proposed in the past, the most significant concerns brought up by
opponents have been twofold: 1) how a GAI could be financed/funded; and 2) the negative
effects of providing every citizen with a basic income floor (mainly the labour/work-effort
disincentives). Both Forget and Segal37 argue that a GAI scheme would not be prohibitively
costly (figures from a variety of authors range from $30 billion to $50 billion per year); there
would be little in the way of costs-of-work disincentives, and the social returns through
improved education outcomes, reduced health-care costs and improved labour productivity
could result in net savings to government from a GAI.38
The ultimate cost of a universal GAI scheme based on the federal OAS/GIS could be much
less than the estimated $30 billion to $50 billion. Expenditures for introducing a GAI for all
Canadians will at least partially be compensated for by savings on administrative costs for
various income-support programs and health-care utilization. Current provincial assistance
programs are not unified. If we could use the existing federally controlled GAI through
OAS/GIS to replace provincially run programs, significant savings could accrue.
34 Forget, “The Town.”
35 Ken Battle and Sherri Torjman, “Yes, Virginia, There is a Guaranteed Annual Income” (Caledon Institute of Social
Policy, 2000), http://www.caledoninst.org/Publications/PDF/gaicomm.pdf; Battle, “Rethinking Income”; Canadian
Council on Social Development, “The Progress of Canada’s Children and Youth 2006” (Ottawa: 2006); Segal,
“Guaranteed Annual”; Segal, “Scrapping Welfare.”
36 Basic Income Canada Network: http://biencanada.ca.
37 Forget, “The Town”; Segal, “Guaranteed Annual”; Segal, “Scrapping Welfare.”
38 Margaret Clarke et al., “A Basic Annual Income for the Neuro-Developmentally Disabled in Canada,” Policy Options
(May 2012); Segal, “Guaranteed Annual”; Segal, “Scrapping Welfare.” Here the figure of $30 billion is used. Hum
and Simpson estimate that the cost of a GAI through a negative-income-tax model with benefit levels comparable to
those of the current OAS/GIS benefits would be closer to $50 billion in 2012 purchasing power (Derek Hum and
Wayne Simpson, “The Cost of Eliminating Poverty in Canada: Basic Income with an Income Test Twist,” in The
Ethics and Economics of the Basic Income Guarantee, ed. K. Widerquist, M. Lewis and S. Pressman, Aldershot,
U.K.: Ashgate, 2005, 282-292).
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Forget39 analyzed health-administration data from the time of the Mincome GAI experiment in
the 1970s and found the overall hospitalization rate (and specifically hospitalizations for
injuries and accidents, and mental health) fell significantly (by 8.5 per cent, relative to the
comparison group) during the duration of the experiment.40 From our results, which are novel
in GAI argumentation, we would also expect to see significant cost savings in the publicly
funded health-care system. Our results showing the OAS leading away from food insecurity
and away from poor/fair self-reported health and mental health are clearly aligned with a large
literature that shows that poverty is related to poor health.41 The link between income adequacy
and health includes a negative association between perceived health, mental health, and
psychological stress.42 Physical and mental health have important impacts on the labour
market, affecting the capacity to work, labour-force participation, wages, and job security and
choice.43
The biggest impediments to the universal application of a GAI are the concerns over labour-
market disincentive effects and the overall cost to the public purse of the scheme.44 Proponents
of a GAI point to evidence from the 1970s Negative Income Tax experiments where they
interpret that the disincentive effects for labour supply and the social costs of a GAI were not
found to be large. These large experiments were conducted at a time of economic prosperity
when funding for large welfare reforms was available, and elimination of state poverty was a
proclaimed goal of the U.S. presidential administration. They were among the first large-scale
social experiments, and not primarily designed to test the policy (GAI), but rather the side-
effects of the policy (e.g., labour disincentives).45
39 Forget, “The Town.”
40 ibid.
41 Committee on the Social Determinants of Heath (CSDH), “Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health Equity through
Action on the Social Determinants of Health.” (Geneva: Final Report of the Commission on Social Determinants of
Health, 2008); Michael B. Marmot, Jessica Allen and Peter Goldblatt, “A Social Movement, Based on Evidence, to
Reduce Inequalities in Health,” Social Science and Medicine 71, 7 (2010): 1254-58; Kate E. Pickett and Richard G.
Wilkinson, “Greater Equality and Better Health,” British Medical Journal 339 (2009): b4320; Dennis Raphael,
“Poverty, Income Inequality, and Health in Canada” (CSJ Foundation for Research and Education, 2002),
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/15466/1/Poverty%20Income%20Inequality%20and%20Health
%20in%20Canada.pdf?1; Charlemaigne C. Victorino and Anne H. Gauthier, “The Social Determinants of Child
Health: Variations across Health Outcomes — A Population-Based Cross-Sectional Analysis,” BMC Pediatrics 9, 1
(2009): 53.
42 For a review, see: Nathalie Auger and Carolyne Alix, “Income, Income Distribution, and Health in Canada,” in
Social Determinants of Health, ed. Dennis Raphael (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 2008), 61-74.
43 For a review, see: Janet Currie and Brigitte C. Madrian, “Health, Health Insurance and the Labor Market,” in
Handbook of Labor Economics, ed. O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (Amsterdam: 1999), 3309-3415.
44 Chandra Pasma, “Working Through the Work Disincentive,” Basic Income Studies 5, 2 (December 2010).
45 Data from the experiments showed mostly positive effects on health, homeownership, reduction of low birth-weight,
school performance, and other indicators of well-being. Robert A. Levine et al., “Looking Back at the Negative
Income Tax Experiments from 30 Years on,” in The Ethics and Economics of the Basic Income Guarantee, ed.
Michael Anthony Lewis, Steven Pressman and Karl Widerquist (New York: Ashgate, 2004), 95-109; Karl
Widerquist,“A Failure To Communicate: What (If Anything) Can We Learn From the Negative Income Tax
Experiments?” The Journal of Socio-Economics 34, 1 (2005): 49-81.
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Results derived from the four basic income experiments in the United States have been
analyzed numerous times with respect to their effect on labour disincentives. Hum and
Simpson46 assessed that the data from Manitoba’s Mincome experiment showed that annual
hours of work for men declined by only one per cent.47
While labour-supply responses were larger in the U.S. experiments,48 overall Hum and
Simpson49 conclude that “the preponderance of evidence from the experiments testifies for
those who would argue that a guaranteed income plan, or indeed other changes in social policy
which alter the tax rate and transfer income received by households, will not have large work
disincentives.”
Critics of a GAI scheme do not find the evidence from the earlier NIT experiments as
sufficiently compelling for informing us about labour-supply disincentive effects of a
guaranteed income. There is a view that the results are “dated,” in the sense that they are now
nearly 40 years in the past and observed during economic conditions specific to that time
period. Further, there are legitimate concerns as to the limitations of the experiments, such as
the fact that individuals who received a GAI knew that they would be only getting the GAI for
a certain amount of time. Such knowledge could result in a different labour response than the
knowledge that one will receive a “true” basic income during their lifetime.
Empirical studies of labour supply of low-income Canadians since the late 1980s have been
interpreted as showing larger labour-market disincentive effects of income transfers to low-
income persons, but an alternative interpretation is that, with one exception, they do not
overturn the conclusion of Hum and Simpson. Lemieux and Milligan’s study50 of less-educated
men aged 25 to 35 without dependent children in Quebec finds that a 175 per cent increase in
social assistance benefits at age 30 reduced the employment rate for this group of men by three
to five percentage points, and reduced the employment rate of all men in the age group without
dependent children by one percentage point. Lemieux and Milligan51 assess that these changes
in employment rates in the context of such a large increase in benefits represent “relatively
modest behavioural effects.”52 A more recent study evaluating minimum income schemes
proposed for Quebec by a 2009 advisory committee studying ways to fight poverty and social
exclusion (the Comité consultative de lutte contre la pauvreté et l’exclusion sociale, or CCLP),
46 Derek Hum and Wayne Simpson, “Whatever Happened to Canada’s Guaranteed Income Project?” Canadian Public
Administration 36, 3 (1993a): 442-450; Derek Hum and Wayne Simpson, “A Guaranteed Annual Income? From
Mincome to the Millenium,” Policy Options (2001): 78-82.
47 ibid.
48 Hum and Simpson report that evidence suggests that the decline in annual hours of work for men was larger at six
per cent in four negative-income-tax experiments in the United States before 1980. Females also showed larger
reductions in annual hours of work of 15 per cent to 19 per cent. Derek Hum and Wayne Simpson, “Economic
Response to a Guaranteed Annual Income — Experience from Canada and the United States,” Journal of Labor
Economics 11, 1 (1993): S263-96; Widerquist,“A Failure”; Levine et al., “Looking Back.” 
49 Hum and Simpson “Whatever Happened,” 449
50 Thomas Lemieux and Kevin Milligan, “Incentive Effects of Social Assistance: A Regression Discontinuity
Approach,” Journal of Econometrics 142 (2008) 807-828.
51 ibid., 826.
52 Lemieux and Milligan, “Incentive Effects.”
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used SLID data for non-disabled single males and single females aged 18 to 65, simulating
large increases in labour force non-participation under several models of a minimum income
scheme comparable to what would exist under a GAI based on federal OAS/GIS benefits. For
single men and single women without children, there would be around a 20 per cent reduction
in the labour-force participation rate.53
Clavet, Duclos and Lacroix54 estimate that the expected reductions in work effort among single
men and single women in Quebec in response to a minimum income scheme would quadruple
its ultimate cost over what the existing cost estimates suggest. Considering what this would
mean for a GAI Canada-wide, the annual cost put forward by proponents of $30 billion to $50
billion for a universal GAI would potentially be as much as $120 billion to $200 billion
annually. 
The uncertainty over labour-market disincentive effects of a GAI should not be used to reject a
GAI scheme for Canada, but instead used to guide a phased-in introduction of a GAI with the
intent of determining the extent of the ultimate coverage of the scheme. For example, if the
GAI were extended by reducing the age of eligibility for OAS/GIS benefits incrementally over
time, as the federal government is currently doing in raising the age of entitlement, then it
would be possible to monitor the size of the labour-supply response and the cost of the
scheme’s extension. Similarly, a GAI has also recently been suggested for Canadians with
disabilities.55 The House of Commons Standing Committee on Human Resources, Social
Development, and the Status of Persons with Disabilities (HUMA) suggested an income-tested
basic income for individuals with disabilities in their Federal Poverty Reduction Plan. HUMA
further suggested that a GAI for the disabled would be a first step towards a more universal
application of a GAI across the population. Clarke et al. recommended a GAI for Canadians
with neuro-developmental disabilities, based on the results that the income disparity between
disabled and non-disabled are dramatically reduced once they turn 65 years of age and are thus
eligible for OAS payments.56
53 Nicholas-James Clavet, Jean-Yves Duclos and Guy Lacroix, “Fighting Poverty: Assessing the Effect of Guaranteed
Minimum Income Proposals in Québec,” Canadian Public Policy 39, 4 (2013).
54 ibid.
55 Clarke et al., “A Basic Annual”; House of Commons Canada, Standing Committee on Human Resources, Skills and
Social Development, and the Status of Persons with Disabilities (HUMA), “Federal Poverty Reduction Plan:
Working in Partnership Towards Reducing Poverty in Canada,” 2010,
http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/Committee/403/HUMA/Reports/RP4770921/humarp07/humarp07-e.pdf; Ronald
D. Kneebone and Oksana Grynishak, “Income Support for Persons with Disabilities,” The SPP Research Papers 4,
11 (2011); Michael Mendelson et al., “A Basic Income Plan for Canadians with Severe Disabilities” (Caledon
Institute of Social Policy, 2010), http://www.caledoninst.org/Publications/PDF/906ENG.pdf.
56 Clarke et al., “A Basic Annual”; Clarke et al. (“A Basic Annual”) performed a costing analysis providing neuro-
developmentally disabled Canadians with a guaranteed annual income of $14,708 per year, equivalent to the
maximum seniors’ benefits (OAS plus GIS) payment. The authors concluded that the expenditure required for
providing a basic income for their target group with employment earnings of less than $15,000 would amount to one
per cent of current federal government expenditures (taking into account that a large part of the cost is already being
covered by current programs).
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One final issue that is often raised is that the costs of a GAI, as we propose it, would be borne
by the federal government, while the benefits in terms of reduced social assistance and reduced
health-care spending would be captured by the provinces. While it has been identified that the
challenges of working out the federal-provincial issues could be a barrier to a GAI, we do not
see this as a serious problem. Historically, the OAS and GIS were introduced under the same
conditions. Transfers of cash and tax points can feasibly be adjusted between the federal
government and the provinces and have been adjusted in the past. For example, the
introduction of the federal National Child Benefit program in 1998 was integrated with
provincial social assistance.57 
CONCLUSION
Although the reduction of seniors’ poverty through the implementation of the federal pension
system in the 1970s, which can essentially be considered a GAI for anyone age 65 or older, is
well-known to Canadian policy-makers as one of the big Canadian policy “success stories,”58
no action has yet been taken to extend a GAI to all Canadians in an attempt to reduce or
eliminate poverty. A GAI provides households with consumption insurance that is not available
to them through private means and markets. We found household food insecurity to be a useful
consumption-based indicator of poverty that changed with age and food security status in a
sample of low-income, unattached persons aged 55–74 years whose main personal income
source shifted after age 65 to the OAS program. Although we suggest that more detailed
costing and benefit analyses are warranted, considering our findings and the effect size of the
GAI on low-income adults over 65 years of age, it is tempting to suggest that providing an
income floor to all Canadians — that is, expanding the GAI system to all Canadians — could
prove to be a highly efficient anti-poverty strategy.
Our analysis was mainly limited by the dataset available to us — CCHS public-use data files
— which only provides crude age and income measures. A finer analysis of CCHS microdata
should be undertaken for costing purposes and to model the health gains and food insecurity
reduction into other household configurations, other age groups, and for specific jurisdictions. 
57 Kevin Milligan and Mark Stabile, “The Integration of Child Tax Credits and Welfare: Evidence from the Canadian
National Child Benefit program,” Journal of Public Economics 91, 1-2 (2007): 305-326.
58 Myles, “The Maturation”; Osberg, “Poverty among.”
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http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/canadian-dollar-and-dutch-and-canadian-diseases
Serge Coulombe | October 2013
GRASPING AT STRAWS: COMMENTS ON THE ALBERTA PIPELINE SAFETY REVIEWX
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/grasping-straws-comments-alberta-pipeline-safety-review
Jennifer Winter | October 2013
ENHANCING THE ALBERTA TAX ADVANTAGE WITH A HARMONIZED SALES TAX
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/enhancing-alberta-tax -advantage-harmonized-sales-tax
Philip Bazel and Jack M. Mintz | September 2013
